

## Curriculum Map

**Subject:** Philosophy – Metaphysics of Mind

**Year Group:** Year 13

	Autumn 1	Autumn 2	Spring 1	Spring 2	Summer 1	Summer 2
<p>Content <i>Descriptive/prop ositional knowledge</i></p> <p><i>‘knowing that’</i></p>	<p><b>3.4. 1 What do we mean by ‘mind’?</b> Features of mental states: • All or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties • Some, but not all, philosophers use the term 'qualia' to refer to these properties, where 'qualia' are defined as 'intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible' • All or at least some mental states have intentional properties (ie intentionality).</p> <p><b>3.4.2 Dualist theories</b> Substance dualism Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.</p>	<p><b>3.4.2 Dualist theories</b> <b>Issues Issues facing dualism,</b> including: • The problem of other minds • Responses including: • the argument from analogy • the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis. • Dualism makes a "category mistake" (Gilbert Ryle) <b>Issues facing interactionist dualism,</b> including: • the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia) • the empirical interaction problem. <b>Issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism,</b> including: • the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge • the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both</p>	<p><b>3.4.3 Physicalist theories</b> <b>Physicalism</b> Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist).</p> <p><b>Philosophical behaviourism:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 'Hard' behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/ movements (including Carl Hempel).</li> </ul>	<p><b>3.4.3 Physicalist theories</b> <b>Mind-brain type identity theory</b>  All mental states are identical to brain states ('ontological' reduction) although 'mental state' and 'brain state' are not synonymous (so not an 'analytic' reduction).</p> <p><b>Issues including:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• dualist arguments applied to mind-brain type identity theory</li> <li>• issues with providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states).</li> </ul> <p><b>Eliminative materialism</b> Some or all common-sense</p>	<p><b>3.4.4 Functionalism</b>  Functionalism: all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.</p> <p><b>Issues, including:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia)</li> <li>• the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned Block's China thought experiment)</li> <li>• the 'knowledge'/Mar y argument can be applied to</li> </ul>	<p>Y13 leave school</p>

	<p>The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes). Responses, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the mental is divisible in some sense</li> <li>• not everything thought of as physical is divisible.</li> </ul> <p>The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes). Responses including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• mind without body is not conceivable</li> <li>• what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible</li> <li>• what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world</li> </ul> <p><b>Property dualism</b> There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.</p> <p><b>The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David Chalmers).</b></p>	<p>psychological and psycho-physical)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution</li> </ul> <p>Revision - preparing for Mock exam on Dualism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 'Soft' behaviourism: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language) (including Gilbert Ryle).</li> </ul> <p>Issues including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• dualist arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism</li> <li>• the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary Putnam's 'Super-Spartans' and perfect actors)</li> <li>• issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to (a) circularity and (b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour</li> <li>• the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental</li> </ul>	<p>("folk-psychological") mental states/properties do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken (as defended by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland).</p> <p><b>Issues including:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations</li> <li>• folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis)</li> <li>• the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting.</li> </ul>	<p>functional facts (no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia).</p> <p><b>Revision / Examination Preparation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To understand the requirements of answering an examination paper successfully</li> <li>- To revise key content from all Modules</li> </ul>	
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	<p>Responses including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• a 'philosophical zombie'/a 'zombie' world is not conceivable</li><li>• what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible</li><li>• what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.</li></ul> <p><b>The 'knowledge/Mary' argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson).</b></p> <p>Responses including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the 'ability knowledge' response).</li><li>• Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge (the 'acquaintance knowledge' response).</li><li>• Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the 'New</li></ul>		states.			
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	Knowledge / Old Fact' response).					
Skills <i>Ability knowledge</i> <i>'knowing how'</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To be able to accurately use/define key words; theories; premises and examples – AO1 skills.</li> <li>- To accurately complete analysis of theories and identify strengths and weaknesses - (including counter-examples) – AO2 skills</li> <li>- To be able to draw links between theories across all modules.</li> <li>- To accurately apply the correct content knowledge to examination questions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To be able to accurately use/define key words; theories; premises and examples – AO1 skills.</li> <li>- To accurately complete analysis of theories and identify strengths and weaknesses - (including counter-examples) – AO2 skills</li> <li>- To be able to draw links between theories across all modules.</li> <li>- To accurately apply the correct content knowledge to examination questions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To be able to accurately use/define key words; theories; premises and examples – AO1 skills.</li> <li>- To accurately complete analysis of theories and identify strengths and weaknesses - (including counter-examples ) – AO2 skills</li> <li>- To be able to draw links between theories across all modules.</li> <li>- To accurately apply the correct content knowledge to examination questions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To be able to accurately use/define key words; theories; premises and examples – AO1 skills.</li> <li>- To accurately complete analysis of theories and identify strengths and weaknesses - (including counter-examples) – AO2 skills</li> <li>- To be able to draw links between theories across all modules.</li> <li>- To accurately apply the correct content knowledge to examination questions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To use mark schemes to support independent revision and examination question practice</li> <li>- To self-assess individual progress according to feedback given by the teacher</li> <li>- To reACT to feedback given by the teacher and improve areas of work</li> </ul>	

Key Questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What is the mind?</li> <li>- What is the explanatory gap?</li> <li>- Is the mind separate from the body?</li> <li>- What is consciousness?</li> <li>- What are the properties or qualities of the mind?</li> <li>- What is substance dualism?</li> <li>- Is Descartes successful in proving substances dualism using the indivisibility and conceivability argument</li> <li>- What is qualia?</li> <li>- What is a philosophical zombie?</li> <li>- Is Chalmers Zombie argument successful?</li> <li>- What is the knowledge argument from Jackson and is it successful?</li> <li>-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If dualism is correct how does the non physical mind interact with the physical body?</li> <li>- What are the issues facing interactionist dualism and are they fatal?</li> <li>- What is epiphenomenalism and can it explain interaction?</li> <li>- What is the problem of other minds, and can it be successfully responded to?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What is Physicalism?</li> <li>- What is an analytical reduction?</li> <li>- What is hard behaviourism?</li> <li>- What are the issues with hard behaviourism?</li> <li>- What is soft behaviourism?</li> <li>- What does Ryle mean by a hypothetical disposition?</li> <li>- Can talk of mental states be reduced without remainder to behaviour</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What is an ontological reduction and how is it different to an analytical reduction?</li> <li>- What is MBTIT?</li> <li>- How could talk of mental states be reduced to brain states?</li> <li>- Is MBTIT a successful way of understanding the mind?</li> <li>- What is folk psychology?</li> <li>- Is it reasonable to argue that all talk of mental states could one day be eliminated?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What are the modules that will be included in the A level examination?</li> <li>- How many marks is the paper out of?</li> <li>- What are the four different types of question that I might be asked?</li> <li>- What are my areas of strength?</li> <li>- Which areas have I shown to have gaps in knowledge?</li> <li>- Which type of question did I find most difficult?</li> </ul>	
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Enrichment	Key teachings Enrichment	Key teachings Enrichment	Key teachings Enrichment	Key teachings Enrichment	Revision sessions	Revision sessions
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Assessment objective weightings for A-level  
Philosophy

Assessment objectives (AOs)	Component weightings (approx %)		Overall weighting (approx %)
	Paper 1	Paper 2	
AO1	30	30	60
AO2	20	20	40
Overall weighting of components	50	50	100

Assessment weightings

The marks awarded on the papers will be scaled to meet the weighting of the components. Students' final marks will be calculated by adding together the scaled marks for each component. Grade boundaries will be set using this total scaled mark. The scaling and total scaled marks are shown in the table below.

Component	Maximum raw mark	Scaling factor	Maximum scaled
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